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Introduction:
Chester Crocker of Georgetown University talks about how
Tracks I and II commonly misunderstand each other. Track I actors tend to be either
ignorant or skeptical the contribution of Track II. Track II actors, on the other hand, tend to overestimate their contribution and are sometimes skeptical of Track I's motives for intervention. Crocker suggests that although every institution has its agenda, they can work together toward their common goal of peace.
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This rough transcript provides a text alternative to audio. We apologize for occasional errors and unintelligible sections (which are marked with ???).
Track I/II and the Ivory Coast
Chester Crocker
Georgetown University
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Q: I read
that you said that Track I often underestimates Track II, and that Track II
often overestimates itself. Can you elaborate on that?
A: Well, I think to some extent the practitioners of these different Tracks
know each other better than they did ten years ago, but they're still not in the
same world. They do not live in the same world and they don't necessarily know
each other very well. There's some isolation and probably some stereotyping, and
that leads to these misperceptions. The Track I actors typically assume that
what they can bring to the table is the only thing that counts. Because they do
have certain kinds of sources of leverage, they may assume that nobody else has
anything much to contribute, and they probably exaggerate the extent to which
tangible carrots and sticks are what make all the difference. That's especially
true of major powers who may think that way. When France called the parties
together in Cote d'Ivoire recently for a meeting just outside Paris, one wonders
the extent to which the organizers were thinking through who really has good
linkages to these guys and who really knows them well. Chirac personally and ???
went in there with an agenda and said here's the way it's going to be, work with
us and you'll get peace.
Q: Is that a likely formula for success?
A: Well, you do have to be self-confident and have a sense of direction, but
being too closed with blinders on may lead you to mistakes, and people may say
things that they want you to believe without really meaning it. I think
sometimes Track I actors may either be ignorant of or skeptical of the
contributions that Track II actors can make. That's historically not surprising
because Track II has come into its own so recently. It really did not have the
potential until the Cold War was over that it seems to have today. That's maybe
a couple of reasons why Track I participants may underestimate what Track II can
accomplish. Track I actors may be suspicious of Track-Track II actors, and maybe
on good reason on occasion. It may seem that Track-Track II actors in fact are
direct rivals, either strategic rivals or just in terms of coherence of their
rivals, and that they will encourage the parties to go forum shopping and play
mind games with the parties and distract the parties.
Often these parties are
fighting as well as negotiating, and they have limited talent and that talent
gets distracted. The Track I people may look at all the initiatives that they
see coming from offstage, so to speak, as complicating the game. In fact, it
does complicate the game. That's why a smart Track I actor will try to find out
what the other guys are doing, the other third parties, and where possible try
to coordinate rather than just be in the dark. An awful lot of Track II is based on if you read some of the early
Track II classics, and I'm sure you have, the writings makes it sound a little
bit as if Track II is morally anointed or ethically anointed, a kind of superior
tradecraft or practice because of a presumed notion that objectivity,
neutrality, and lack of bias are good, and that they have a monopoly on lack of
bias.
The reality is much more complicated than that, as I think many people now
recognize, that every institution has its agendas. Even small institutions have
their agendas, and sometimes the motivation of small actors can be as suspect as
the motivation of big actors. I think warring parties have come to realize that
sometimes too. Why are there so many of these people getting off these airplanes
and coming to talk to me? What's in it for them and what's in it for me? It may
be that there is, as I say, this presumption that people who work for
governments are basically either biased or they're carrying out agendas that are
not consistent with the parties' own interests. That's, frankly, a view
that I have great difficulty with, but I can understand, if people aren't
talking to each other, why they might have that notion. The reality is that a
world at peace is a world in which most government's interests will be advanced.
To put it another way, a world that is at peace is one in which a commercial
superpower like the United States will have more exports, and exports means
jobs.
Q: In this country?
A: In this country? Sure.
Q: So there's the agenda.
A: Yeah, I mean, peace is good. Peace is good for Americans, and I think that
message is not all that complicated to understand. I don't really have the
difficulty, the hang-up with the motivations of Track I that maybe some of my
friends in the Track II universe have. The real issue here, and it's been one
that's studied a lot-I'm sure you've read countless articles about it-is the
issue of whether bias is good for you or bad for you, whether interest is good
for you or bad for you. On that point, my take is very simple: if you don't have
interest you won't mediate anyway. I'm looking for interested mediators,
especially amongst governments, because I want them to really care. I don't want
to see our country or other governments go into this business just to play
pretend games. I want them to care enough to see it through and to get a result.
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