Track One-Track Two Cooperation
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William Zartman discusses several "gaps" between different approaches to conflict resolution.
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Chester Crocker offers some insight as to how Track II actors might approach and work with Track I.
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Carolyn Stephenson discusses the importance of parallel timelines for Track I and Track II.
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Carolyn Stephenson describes a Track II effort that got stymied by Track I concerns.
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Chester Crocker talks about how Tracks I and II commonly misunderstand each other.
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Peter Coleman discusses the transformation of a track two process to a track one process.
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Chester Crocker discusses the success of the peace process in Mozambique.
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John McDonald of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy describes the challenges he has faced in trying to better coordinate Track I and Track II diplomacy. In particular, he focuses on getting the US government to pay closer attention to Track II.
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John McDonald of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy describes the major obstacles for success in his work. He focuses on funding and building understanding on the part of Track I.
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John McDonald of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy describes his work in Bosnia.
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John McDonald of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy describes his work in Nepal.
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John McDonald of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy describes his work in Georgia.
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John McDonald of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy describes to trace the links between different tracks and develop a conceptual framework for achieving peace between the tracks.
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Chester Crocker describes the critical role that insider partial intervenors sometimes play in Track I negotiations.
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Ron Fisher describes Track I-II coordination in Tajikistan.
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Ron Fisher describes the relationship between Track I and Track II players.
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Ron Fisher describes the importance of pre-negotiation interventions in intractable conflict.
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Herb Kelman explains that problem solving workshops can develop new approaches for transforming conflict, but cannot implement them. Track I leaders need to do that, and they need to educate the public to gain their support.
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Herb Kelman reflects on how one "moves up" from the small-group process of problem solving workshops to having a larger societal or political impact.
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Herb Kelman reflects on his role in what went right and wrong with the Oslo Accords.
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Mohammed Abu-Nimer describes the misperceptions people have about peacebuilding. These misperceptions hamper its effectiveness, he feels. One misperception is about the different roles and relationships between Track I and Track II, and who is responsible for doing what.
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