Reconciliation in the Aftermath of the Yezidi Genocide

 

by Marian Rizkalla

Introduction

August 3, 2014, was the day the self-proclaimed Islamic State led a genocidal campaign targeting the Yezidi ethnoreligious minority group in Iraq, based on claims that they are “devil-worshippers”. Following Edward Azar’s[1] theory of protracted social conflict, this paper examines the genocide as part of a protracted social conflict in Iraq particularly rooted in the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. By shifting the focus from terrorism to the theory of protracted social conflict this paper suggests that military interventions or dismantling ISIS alone, are not sufficient for conflict transformation and reconciliation. This is crucial because most media discourses have focused on the genocide as the result of ISIS’ jihadism and radicalism. While this is partly true, it is a highly insufficient analytical lens because given the global agenda of the war on terror; media discourses have strategically leveraged terrorism for its high visibility, but in return have isolated the genocide from its systemic sociohistorical factors. Consequently, terrorism has become a catchphrase serving as the green light for many wars and invasions. It is therefore important to consider reconciliation-centered initiatives to address such deeply rooted conflicts and to avoid future outbreaks of violence.

Following Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess, it is important to consider a complexity-oriented approach to reconciliation since this conflict is multilayered and multi-dimensional[2]. Yezidis suffer from internal and external conflicts. Externally, ISIS’ violent attack and sexual enslavement of Yazidis have greatly damaged communal relationships between Sunnis and Yezidis. Moreover, Yezidis are extremely distrustful of both the Kurdish regional government as well as the central government of Iraq[3].

Yezidis therefore, need to be reconciled with three parties: the central government of Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Sunni Arab community. I would also add a fourth party that needs to be reconciled which is Yezidis themselves, at the individual level but also, within the community particularly in relation to reintegrating returning sex survivors. Such efforts would require a reinterpretation of the past on the national level, truth and reconciliation commissions at the national and intercommunal level as well as trauma and healing at the personal and interpersonal level[4]. Reconciliation also means addressing the four preconditions of protracted social conflicts as outlined in Azar’s theory, these are: communal content, governance and state role, external linkages and deprivation of basic human need[5].

Who are the Yezidis?

Yezidis are an ethnoreligious minority; the majority has historically inhabited the mountainous region of northern Iraq known as Jabal Sinjar, and located southwest of Mosul. Other Yazidis have inhabited the Shaikhan district, located between the Mosul plain and the Kurdish mountains.[6] The Yezidis of Iraq are Kurdish in ethnicity but speak a Kurdish dialect known as Krumanji. Northern Iraq has always been considered the homeland of Yazidis since the 12th century, when Yezidism started to revive among Kurdish population. The uniqueness of Yezidism lies in it being a religion and an ethnic identity.  As a religion, Yezidism includes syncretic elements from Sufism, Shi'ite sects, pre-Islamic beliefs, Sunnism and Christianity.[7]

The Yezidis’ settlement within the boundaries of mount Sinjar reinforced their distinctiveness as an ethnoreligious group among a predominantly Sunni region and acted as a powerful catalyst for group mobilization in times of conflict. Although, Yezidis shared many social and culture ties with their Sunni Kurdish neighbors, contact between the two communities was scarce and tension between Yezidis and their Muslim neighbors has deep historic roots.[8]

Background: The 2014 Yezidi Genocide

3 August, 2014, the day ISIS captures Sinjar was a public holiday for Yezidis. It was around dusk, that ISIS militants and vehicles began appearing, eventually took over the entire region of Sinjar. Around 6,383 Yezidis, the majority of were women and children were and trafficked into slave markets. At least 3 thousand Yezidis were killed and the rest were left to die in the mountain as a result of injuries, starvation and dehydration[9]. Eight years after the genocide, the area of mount Sinjar previously inhabited by Yezidis is still contested between the central government of Bagdad and the Kurdish regional government, and remains uninhabitable. Many Yezidis are still refugees in different parts of the world; the majority of the population is internally displaced, living in refugee camps the city of Dohuk, and others are missing. Thus despite attempts by the international community and non-governmental agencies to ameliorate the lives of Yezidis, rebuilding and reintegration thus far have not been achieved.[10]

Framing the genocide as part of a Protracted Social Conflict

The framework of protracted social conflicts is useful to the understanding of the Yezidi genocide for two main reasons. The first is that genocide is not just an event of mass killing but rather a continuum and a process of destruction of people groups.[11] In this particular case, it has deep roots in the history of sectarian relations in Iraq. The second reason is that understanding the attitudes of the Yezidi community towards reconciliation and coexistence requires a historic examination of their position in Iraq which goes beyond the recent events of violence at the hands of ISIS.[12] Edward Azar details four main preconditions that are necessary for these intractable conflicts to occur. These conditions are: communal content, governance and state role, deprivation of human needs, and external linkages.[13] On Communal Content, Azar identifies identity groups, including racial, religious, ethnic, or other groups, as the most useful unit of analysis in PSCs.[14] The history of Iraq, evidentially shows that the gulf between communal content and the state is linked to the colonial legacy and the arbitrary geographic integration and marginalization of land occupied by different ethno-religious groups into one entity.[15] From the start, identity based categorizations were established by the colonial powers as a way of government, favoring the Sunni minority over the majority Shiites.[16] The Kurds integration into Arab Iraq was also a clear misfit because they had previously been granted autonomy as a distinct ethnic group and to this very day they continue to fight for their independence.[17]

In the case of the Yezidis, their isolated settlement within the boundaries of mount Sinjar reinforced their distinctiveness as an ethnoreligious group. The process of nation-building however, failed to integrate Yezidis into the nation. Instead the government established discriminatory policies by supporting Sunni colonization of mount Sinjar.[18] The precondition of governance and the state being incompetence and authoritarian is also highly applicable to Iraq. Throughout its history, the Iraqi government had failed adopt a more inclusionary form of nationalism that could unify all Iraqis but have attempted to mold the different sects, through authoritarian means, into a broader Arab project that would serve their interests.[19] A process of systematic Arabization began in the 1970s and continued throughout Saddam’s regime had significantly impacted Sunni Kurds and Yezidis who had to deny their distinctive history.[20] Yezidis were thoroughly evicted from their villages and forced to identify themselves as Arabs and they could neither study their religion nor worship freely in schools. [21]

The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was particularly instrumental in causing state failure and the rise of terrorist organizations. It is worth noting that prior to the American invasion; identity politics was not inherent to Iraqi politics. Following the 2003 invasion however, sectarian identity politics became in and of itself the primary marker of politics in Iraq.[22] The aim of the ‘de-Ba’thification’ process was not just the removal of Saddam’s regime, but it also included the abolishment of Iraqi institutions which were fundamental for keeping the state intact.[23] The U.S had adopted a policy of sectarian politics but this time favoring the Shiite majority over the Sunni ruling minority and promoting the autonomy of the Kurdish northern region. This sudden shift in power created a political imbalance causing outbursts of violence that were viable in the absence of state apparatuses which were eradicated by the U.S. [24]

Azar identifies the deprivation of nonnegotiable and ontological human needs including security, development, and identity, as another precondition underlying protracted social conflicts.[25] It is worth stressing that Iraq before 2003 has never experienced jihadist insurgency. After 2003, many young men who were now facing unemployment and deep economic repercussions as a result of the war and the dissolution of state institutions began to organize resistance groups to express their grievances against western invaders and Political Islam provided them with the rhetoric for resistance.[26]It was in this environment that Al-Qaida, which first branded itself as Al-Qaida in Iraq as an affiliate of the Al Qaida network and later turned into the Islamic State, was able to take advantage of these grievances and penetrate the city of Mosul, recruiting thousands of Iraqi fighters. Resistance was now a holy war which was made viable through Al-Qaida extensive networks and resources.[27]

As part of the plan to purify Iraq from the infidels, Yezidis also became a target for Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The targeting of Yezidis climaxed during the civil war between 2007- 2009, with multiple attacks and executions on the Yezidi community including the killing of 500 Yezidis in a single day in 2007 and another devastating attack on mount Sinjar in 2008, killing 796 and leaving 1500 wounded. [28]

External Linkages is another precondition that is necessary for protracted social conflicts. While various sectarian groups have continually formed linkages with neighboring countries such as the Shiites and the Kurds with Iran, the Arab Spring of 2011 and the crisis in Syria had direct implications on Iraq. When the Arab uprisings took place, thousands of Iraqis mobilized themselves to express their discontent with the government’s oppression and corruption. The crisis in Syria was particularly strategic for ISIS as it was able to recruit plenty of supporters across borders, thus broadening its influence in the region.[29] During this time ISIS had already started to form coalitions with Sunni tribes in rural areas and was able to attract many former Baath officials.  The Iraqi government’s support for Bashar Al Asad’s regime was the final trigger in exacerbating sectarian cleavages, turning the protests into a sectarian clash tearing the country apart that culminated with the genocide of 2014.[30]

Reconciliation: A meeting place for Truth, Mercy, Peace and Justice

To address the issue of reconciliation in the aftermath of the Yezidi genocide, it is worth noting that first and foremost, reconciliation is a transformational social process rather than it being a definitive outcome in finding peace.[31] Applying this to the Yezidi case, means transforming the nature of relationships between Yezidis, the Sunni community, the Kurdish government and the government of Baghdad that are typically immersed in mistrust and violence to relationships that are characterized by increased trust, interdependence and peaceful coexistence. As Lederach notes, reconciliation can be understood as the “meeting place” of the four often competing goals of peace, truth, justice and mercy.[32] Hence for reconciliation to take place in the Yezidi case, the intersection of these four principles must take place and it has to be in relation to the different parties involved in the conflict while also addressing the four preconditions of protracted social conflicts that led to the genocide. Needless to mention that while truth, mercy, justice and peace are simultaneously and altogether mutually essential to reverse the four preconditions of protracted social conflicts; in the following section I will focus on  highlighting how each principle can be used to address one of the preconditions.

Truth: Addressing governance and the State role

One of the key components of the meeting place that must be addressed to reach reconciliation in the aftermath of the Yezidi genocide is truth. Until there is widespread agreement about what happened and who is responsible for it, it is hard to imagine a process of reconciliation happening. Truth is therefore an integral part of confronting “past wrongs” to help groups reconcile.[33] As explained above, from its inception and throughout history, the state of Iraq failed to adopt a more inclusionary form of governance and thoroughly attempted to marginalize and eradicate Yezidis. This became an active policy, following the American invasion which resulted in deepening state failure. Truth in this sense is therefore highly imperative as a top-down approach to address past wrongs and to stop cycles of violence from erupting.

Since narratives about what happened may vary over time and among groups, the use of truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) can be instrumental in creating shared narratives. Truth and reconciliation commissions can be used to unearth and reveal facts concerning the crimes committed during the genocide. It will also mean confronting discomforting issues such as why the Iraqi and Kurdistan governments withdrew troops before ISIS attacked, leaving the Yazidis further exposed.[34]This has largely been viewed as an act of betrayal by Yezidis and has contributed to the overall radicalism in the area. Truth is particularly significant in the attempt to reconcile Yezidis with the governments of Kurdistan and Iraq and will also contribute to the reconciliation within and in between communities since there is a lot of vagueness surrounding the events of 2014. This means that the Iraqi central government and the Kurdish regional government must actively reveal to Yezidi victims and society at large all known facts related to past abuses and violations, search for and identify the dead, investigate and prosecute all those accused of serious rights violations and ensure the prevention of such violations and abuses in the future.[35] These actions should work towards mending the broken trust between Yezidis and the government.

It is also worth noting that since the marginalization of Yezidis has historic roots beyond the genocide, unveiling the truth about the constant targeting of Yezidis in past crimes by Al-Qaeda and by the state of Iraq is essential for reconciliation as these “chosen traumas” have been instrumental in creating a collective identity of Yezidis being a historically persecuted group and a scapegoat. As noted earlier, Truth is not only necessary for exposing past wrongs but are also important for creating a shared narrative for the future. This is particularly significant in the domain of education where the Yezidi identity has been wiped out entirely from history books and the group has been thoroughly targeted by a process of systematic Arabization. While Yezidis have done a great job in keeping memory of their persecution and trauma, through oral history, songs and rituals or even their geographic location of finding refuge in mount Sinjar because of the continuous threat from the “other”, their needs to be a focus on education that fosters healing and reconciliation. Creating a new shared narrative of about what it means to be a Sunni Iraqi, a Yezidi Iraqi, a Christian Iraqi and a Shiite Iraqi and at the same time learning to coexist is essential for future generations. This should also include teaching and preserving the Kurdish language and particularly the Krumanji dialect for Kurds and Yezidis in schools as part of honoring and reviving minority languages. This would require an intentional effort by the two governments to admit past wrongs in TRC’s and to collaboratively work towards reconstructing a shared narrative in school curricula and educational text-books about the pluralistic nature of Iraqi society.

One way to construct this narrative is by pointing to previous times of coexistence and pluralism during monarchial Iraq which was characterized by cosmopolitanism and intellectualism in what was known as the “other Iraq”. Developing this new moral imagination is significant in allowing participants to engage in creating a redemptive history.[36] Truth is essential in addressing the precondition of governance and the state role, and allowing the state to confront its authoritarianism and marginalization of Yezidis in order to imagine a new future where reconciliation is possible.

It is worth noting that justice as will be shown below is an important ally for truth in terms of addressing this precondition of the state role and governance. Truth can be seen as the first step in recognizing the problems of state failure in the past but it will surely take justice to ensure that the same cycles of marginalization and oppression are not repeated. It is also worth noting that the problem of governance and the Iraqi state extend beyond internal factors or governance styles, this will be shown by the role of justice in addressing the precondition of external linkages.

Justice: Addressing External Linkages

As Lederach notes, it is hard to imagine how we can hope to heal deep divisions in the absence of steps to create a more just society. Here, I wish to map the principle of justice with Azar’s precondition of external linkages. Doing so, adds multiple layers of complexity that are indicative of the nature of the problem, but at the same time it presents justice as a goal that extends beyond the specific issue of the Yezidi case. Azar’s conceptualization of external linkages was not just limited to external alliances, but it also relates to how internal policy is dictated by international linkages.[37] Hence, justice in the case of Yezidis is embedded in layers of external linkages, this includes transnational terrorist organizations as well as superpowers like the International community and more precisely the U.S, since the collapse of the state was rooted in the American invasion of 2003. Accordingly, for justice to have its way in the Yezidi case this requires addressing external factors as well as internal ones. Consequently, justice needs to be presented in various forms ranging from retributive justice, reparation as well as restorative justice. It must also be noted that mapping justice with external linkages is an overly ambitious task because a lot of the problems of Iraq in essence depend on decisions made by external actors. Most vividly, the Kurdish quest of whether the semi-autonomous Kurdish region will gain full autonomy as an independent state and will include Kurds from neighboring countries like Iran, Syria and Turkey is a question that is directly related to the future of Yezidis as a Kurdish minority, yet it is one that cannot be answered by simply looking within the state of Iraq. It requires the joint collaboration of regional and international actors and an acknowledgment of what justice would like for this people group. This task that extends far beyond the boundaries of this paper, nevertheless it must be stated, if we are earnestly keen about addressing the preconditions of protracted social conflicts.

One of the tangible and immediate ways that justice can be presented in this case, is justice in the form of reparation which requires a global effort by the International community to support the rebuilding of the collapsed state of Iraq which is directly rooted in the 2003 American invasion, more precisely it requires the rebuilding of the Yezidi community and infrastructure in Sinjar. This shifts the focus from aid in the form of food rations to one in the form of reparation. In one study that to sought to explore what justice means to Yezidi survivors, respondents emphasized the importance of providing amends by restoring and rehabilitating places of origin.[38] Although, Sinjar has been liberated since December 2014, there hasn’t been a consolidated effort to date in rebuilding the area or restoring public services such as healthcare, electricity, infrastructure etc. The return of Yezidis to their hometown which has religious, cultural and historic significance is important for their healing and would also help restore the Yezidis’ trust in the Kurdish government if they show willingness to rebuild and restore Sinjar. In this sense, justice has to be a global effort by external factors like the international community to provide amends for Iraq and for Sinjar, in the aftermath of the genocide.

As mentioned above, the precondition of external linkages is also clearly demonstrated by the fact that ISIS rose within the context of the civil war in Syria during the Arab Spring and had a spillover effect on Iraq. The fact that the newly established caliphate had borders stretching between the two nations, rather than contained within the boundaries of a single nation and also included a transnational dimension with thousands of foreign fighters from different parts of the world taking part in the killing on Iraqi soil during the genocide suggests that justice extends beyond the boundaries of the nation state.[39] Consequently, I think it is crucial to present a multi-faceted notion of justice that balances retributive elements and at the same time advance the notion of restorative justice as proposed by Lederach[40] which is the only way that cycles of violence and the fear-hate spiral can be broken.[41] The way this balance could be reached is by differentiating between external factors namely ISIS as a transnational terrorist organization and internal factors like the impact of ISIS on radicalizing Sunni communities within Iraq.

In one study that sought to explore what justice means to Yezidi survivors, most respondents have defined justice in terms of reclaiming rights and punishing perpetrators. The respondents used the Arabic term ‘adalah’ for justice, which alludes to evenness and equal treatment in relation to punishment in response to atrocities.[42] When asked about legal justice, participants stressed the importance of international courts to ensure fair trials. Many have reflected mistrust that the Kurdish or central government in Baghdad could administer justice in a way that would be satisfactory to the Yezidi community. One of the main problems mentioned by several interviewees was the perceived bias of Iraq’s legal system towards Muslims embedded in Sharia Law.[43] The marginalization and memory of ongoing persecution was also evident in the respondents’ understanding of justice as many defined it as the government’s responsibility to ensure equal treatment regardless of religion, gender, or socioeconomic status.[44]

As a way of addressing Yezidi needs for justice, there needs to be retribution and punitive justice in dealing with terrorist criminal actions, transnational foreign fighters and the leadership of ISIS in Iraq. These can be dealt with using international as well as state courts depending on the case as an attempt to gain the trust of Yezidis and make the necessary amends. However, it is important to note that the only way the cycles of violence and hatred can be broken is ultimately, through restorative justice and this is particularly important since a huge part of society was radicalized and many ordinary citizens embraced the ideology of ISIS in varying degrees or were complicit to the killing, leading to the genocide. In this sense, restorative justice is a strong ally of mercy as will be shown below is necessary for reconciliation and for preventing future outbreaks of violence.

Mercy and Communal Content

It is important to note that mercy can never be achieved without first re-humanizing the other. As Ibrahim Rasool notes this has to start with the realization that the other is here to stay and therefore we have to come up with a plan to live together in peace.[45] Mercy is therefore particularly important in dealing with the precondition of communal content both at the state-level and in between communities.

The process of re-humanization is particularly important because genocides always involve a process of dehumanization that serves as the basis upon which one group attempts to annihilate the other. In the case of the Yezidis, the process of dehumanization was achieved by demonizing them into “devil-worshippers” and Satanists thus depriving them of human qualities, and legitimizing their killing. While many Sunni neighbors refused to join ISIS in their attacks on Yezidis, the fact that they were perceived as devil-worshippers has led many Sunnis to isolate and protect themselves from the evils of Yezidism. Consequently, many Sunni neighbors were complicit to the killing of Yezidis and have left them vulnerable and unprotected. [46]This is an important piece of information when attempting to reconcile Yezidis with the Sunni community. Following Rasool, rehumanizing the other is not only the responsibility of the oppressor but the oppressed must also take responsibility for finding the human commonalities within them.  In this sense, both Sunnis and Yezidis need to mutually redeem each other with a sense of humanity.[47]

It is imperative to note that, since the process of dehumanization has been achieved through religious discourses, it is therefore important to use religious discourses to also re-humanize the other.The theology of ISIS was based on radical texts such as The Management of Slavery which strategizes a roadmap for the creation of the caliphate, The Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Jihad, which calls for Jihadists to do what it takes to establish a purified caliphate and The Essentials of Making Ready (for Jihad) which provides a manual for Jihadis in the training camps.[48]Equally, religion can be employed to promote reconciliation, positive images of the other and sustainable peace. This can be achieved by changing the narrative and discourse to re-humanize the “other” using religious values of compassion and forgiveness. Yezidi Sheikhs can work with Sunni Imams to reverse the false narrative that Yezidis worship the devil by identifying similarities between Yezidism and Islam. This initiative is important because interfaith encounters have often remained marginal or serve as lip service in reconciliation efforts.[49] Religious leaders of the various sects within Iraq can play an important role as insider reconcilers[50] by taking part in creating a shared narrative of mercy towards the other. This needs to be a policy adopted at the state level that influences the type of religious discourse preached in mosques and taught in schools and as a bottom-up approach by doing interfaith dialogues and intercommunal encounters. One way this could be achieved is by having Yezidis and Sunnis participate in the five daily prayers together, something both Yezidism and Islam share.[51] This should also include conciliatory gestures particularly by Sunni neighbors to surprise the other.[52] These acts should help in expanding the individual capacity and circles of compassion towards the other.[53] Doing such acts of shared prayers and conciliatory gestures allows for the adoption of an “everyday peace discourse as a core framework in order to acknowledge and examine the existence of reconciliatory elements embedded in people’s daily living”.[54]

For the Yezidis, cooperating with Arab tribal leaders to help combat the idea among Yezidis that all Sunnis are ISIS sympathizers, combating ideas of collective guilt is critical for reconciliation.[55] One way this could be achieved is by highlighting the victimhood of Sunni Arabs themselves as many were displaced and targeted by ISIS for their refusal to collaborate. Another approach is to draw attention to acts of resistance by the Sunni Arab and Kurdish communities. For example, the actions of Al-Shammar Sunni Arab tribe and its dismissal of IS extremist ideology has served as a positive sign for future reconciliation.[56]

Mercy is also foundational for intra-communal healing and reconciliation. Traditionally, intercourse with members outside of the Yezidi community, whether consensual or not is considered a great taboo. In this sense accepting women who were forced into sex slavery by ISIS is not easy for many members within the community. Following the genocide, the Yezidi spiritual council declared that families should welcome back those who were captured, taking back women who were sold into sex slavery, or forced to convert. The welcoming back of these women has created a revolution in their religion.[57] This becomes an important step in the trauma healing of individuals and reconciliation within the families and the Yezidi community. Thus, mercy and forgiveness is fundamental for healing and reconciliation among individuals and families within the Yezidi community and it can also serve as a model for restorative justice for wider society. In the same way that victims were reintegrated into society despite this being a taboo, this can serve as a way for stretching the boundaries and capacity for mercy by accepting the victimizer or perceived “other” from the Sunni community. This would require framing hatred and violence as the problem and not the people who have committed violence or shown acts of hatred.[58]

Peace: Addressing Basic Human Needs

It is worth mentioning that the dismantling of ISIS and the liberation of Sinjar do not signify a state of peace for Yezidis. In the words of Galtung, it presents a state of negative peace which is simply the absence of violence as opposed to positive peace which involves dealing with structural injustices.[59] For positive peace to exist there must be an end to the structural injustices that Yezidis have experienced throughout history. Social justice is thus a crucial ally to a peaceful way of life for the Yazidi.

This becomes even more crucial when examining the conflict through the lens of protracted social conflicts where the deprivation of basic human needs be it security, identity or access to employment is a precondition for these types of conflict. This has been characteristic of the Iraqi state and these types of grievances have remarkably increased as a result of the dissolution of the state following the 2003 invasion. It was precisely the collective grievances of the Sunni community and their sudden marginalization from political representation that allowed for the spread of radical jihadism as an expression of resistance. In the case of Yezidis, the constant neglect and marginalization left them in a state of isolationism and the wider Kurdish population attempted to satisfy these grievances by forming alliances.

In this sense peace must be understood as positive peace and must include direct efforts to address the basic human needs of the various communities within Iraq. Edward Azar lays a very important foundation in his theory of PSC, which directly links peace with the satisfaction of basic human needs. Azar (1990) argues that peace is development in the broadest sense of the term, thus development with all its various aspects of economic justice, equal representation and even freedom is necessary to achieve reconciliation for the Yezidis.[60]

The starting point to achieve peace would be to ensure the political representation of Yezidis in all forms of governance and have them identify what their needs are. As Priscilla Hayner notes “Political reconciliation is initiated, by the invocation of a ‘we’ that is not yet. By interpreting the present as a moment in which this ‘we’ might one day be understood to have originated, constitution conditions an awareness of the frailty and contingency of community. Because the disclosure of a world in common depends on engaging in collective action, reconciliation unavoidably entails the risk of politics”[61]

Conclusion

            As presented in this paper, reconciliation in the case of Yezidis is a process of transformation that involves dealing with the preconditions of protracted social conflicts through the intersection of truth, justice, peace and mercy at the intercommunal level, at the state level and within the Yezidi community.

 

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[1] Edward Azar, E. Protracted Social Conflict.Journal of Palestine Studies. 1991.

 

[2] Heidi Burgess & Guy Burgess, Complexity-Oriented,Massively Parallel Reconciliation. Beyond Intractibility. 2021.

 

[3] Dave Van Zoonen & Khogir Wirya . The Yazidis Perceptions of Reconciliation and Conflict. The Middle East Research Institute.2017.

[4] Charles Hauss. Making Reconciliation Happen. Beyond Intractibility. 2021

[5] See footnote 1.

[6] Nelida Fuccaro. Ethnicity, State Formation, and Conscription in Postcolonial Iraq: The Case of the Yazidi Kurds of Jabal Sinjar. International Journal of Middle East Studies. 1997. 29(04), 559-580.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Cathy Otten. With ash on their faces: Yezidi women and the Islamic State. New York;

London: OR Books. 2017.

[10] Kerstin Tomiak. After Genocide: How the Yazidi Perceive the Responsibility to Protect and the Actions of the International Community. Centre for Peace and Human Security The American University of Kurdistan.2020.

[11] NancyScheper-Hughes.The Genocidal Continuum: Peace-Time Crimes’, Jeannette MarieMageo (ed.), Power and the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 29–47.

[12] See Footnote 10.

[13] See Footnote 1.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Kumyar Abdi. From Pan-Arabism to Saddam Hussein's cult of personality: Ancient Mesopotamia and Iraqi national ideology. Journal of Social Archeology. 2008.

[16] Peter Sluglett. The British, the Sunnis and the Shiis: Social hierarchies of identity under the British Mandate. International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies. 2010. 4(3).

[17] Kerim Yildiz.Future of Kurdistan : The Iraqi Dilemma. 2011.

[18] See Footnote 6.

[19]  Adeed Dawisha. Iraq: a political history. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2013

[20]  Aram Rafaat. The fundamental characteristics of the Kurdish nationhood project in modern        Iraq. Middle Eastern Studies. 2016. 52(3), 488-504.

[21] Arielle Mullaney,"Wiping out an entire religion: how ISIS will inevitably eliminate an ancient   culture unless the United States employs military and diplomatic intervention." Suffolk Transnational Law Review.2016.

[22] Fawaz Gerges. ISIS: a history. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2016.

[23] Tallha Abdulrazaq & Gareth Stansfield. The Enemy Within: ISIS and the Conquest of Mosul. The Middle East Journal. 2016.70(4), 525-542.

[24] Majid Shihade. Sectarianism as a Modern Mobile Global Structure. Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences. 2009. 1(2), 107-135.

[25] See Footnote 1.

[26]  Ray Taras.The (Il)logic of Intervention in Iraq: Sectarianism, Civil War, and the U.S. Game Plan.International Journal on World Peace, 23(4), 33-60. 2006.

[27]  See Footnote 23.

[28] Craig Whiteside. A Case for Terrorism as Genocide in an Era of Weakened States. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict. 2015. 8(3), 232-250.

[29]  See Footnote 22.

[30] Ibid.

[31] John Pul Lederach. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies.   Washington DC. 1997

[32]  Ibid.

[33]  Heidi Burgess & Guy Burgess. Complexity-Oriented, Massively Parallel Reconciliation.

   Beyond Intractibility. 2021.

[34]  Ariel Harris. “Serenity for Sinjar: Resiliency and Reconciliation”. International Relations. 2021.

[35]  Ibid.

[36] John Paul Lederach. The moral imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace. Oxford University Press Incorporated. 2005.

[37]  Serkan Kara. A Theory of Protracted Social Conflict. HELP University. 2018

[38] See Footnote 10.

[39]  Stathias Kalyvas. Jihadi Rebels in Civil War. MIT Press.American Academy of Arts & Sciences.147(1).36-47. 2018.

[40] See Footnote 31on John Paul Lederach’s notion of Justice in the meeting place.

[41]  Heidi Burgess & Guy Burgess.Challenging "Bad-Faith" Actors Who Seek to Amplify and           Exploit Our Conflicts. Beyond Intractibility. 2021.

      https://www.beyondintractability.org/frontiers/bad-faith-actors

[42]  See Footnote 10.

[43]  Ibid.

[44]  Ibid.

[45] Heidi Burgess. & Guy Burgess. (2020). Ebrahim Rasool on What America Might Learn From South Africa’s 300+ Years of Struggle. Beyond Intractability.

[46]  See Footnote 34.

[47]  See Footnote 37.

[48]  See Footnote 22.

[49] Kevin Clements & SungYong Lee. Multi-level Reconciliation and Peacebuilding:

    Stakeholder Perspectives. Routledge. 2020

[50]  Antti Pentikäinen. Insider Reconcilers Dialogue for Sustaining Peace. Development Dialogue.2019.

[51]  See Footnote 24.

    [52]   Heidi Burgess.The Many Types of Reconciliation. Beyond Intractability. 2022.

[53]  See Footnote 36.

[54] Ibid.

[55]  See Footnote 34.

[56]   Ibid.

[57]  See Footnote 9.

[58]  See Footnote 52.

[59]  Johan Galtung. Theories of Peace: A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking. International

Peace Research Institute. Oslo. 1967

[60]  See Footnote 1.

[61]  Priscilla Hayner. Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commission. 2005.