Kashmir: The Clash of Identities

Neha Navlakha

March, 2009


Kashmir is a divided state. Two of its regions are controlled by Pakistan and three regions are controlled by India. Both countries, however, lay claim to the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Kashmiri people themselves have long been striving for autonomy and ultimately independence. At its core therefore, this is a conflict that is both intrastate and interstate in its nature.

The insurgency began in 1988 initiated by young nationalists from Jammu Kashmir Liberation Force (JKLF) - who crossed over to Pakistan to get trained and armed - supported by Kashmiris who took to the streets to call for a plebiscite after years of being forced to abide by the wishes and rules imposed by the central government. India labeled the insurgency a proxy war by Pakistan and responded with force.[1]

In response to the insurgency, India introduced direct rule in 1990. Security forces moved in, the Kashmiri civil administration - education, services, courts, etc. - collapsed, leading to further suffering, discontent and increased despair in the valley. The desperate situation in Kashmir influenced more young Kashmiris to join the militants, as they could see no nonviolent avenue to initiate change. The militant groups thereby grew in size and also turned more Islamist. This was particularly evident after the cease-fire in 1994, as groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba joined, bringing hardened fighters from Afghanistan, which today form the core of the militants.[2]

After three wars - in 1947, 1965 and 1971 - a serious armed conflict in 1999 in Kargil and a UN resolution promising plebiscite, the conflict is still far from over. Despite numerous attempts at finding a solution, parties to the conflict have repeatedly failed at finding an alternative that would satisfy everyone involved.[3]

Ultimately, the Kashmir conflict embodies a complex amalgamation of religious, nationalist and political factors which are deeply rooted in history. This history dates back to the time when India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were one, a time when the British colonizers adopted their policy of 'divide and rule' to create artificial boundaries between people, instigating the religious violence that continues to plague many parts of India today. The result has been a conflict that has created immense volatility in the entire South Asian region and - because both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons - in extension also poses a grave threat to security and peace in the world at large.


The conflict in Kashmir is rooted in colonialism. As early as 1848 the British Raj sold Kashmir to Hindu Dogra kings for Rs 75 lakhs.[4] During the British rule, the British used 'divide and rule' to exert control over the country. As a result, people who had been living in harmony, despite their varying religions, were now exposed to a classification that created artificial boundaries between them. This was predominantly the case between Hindus and Muslims.

When Partition took place Kashmir was one of the few states with a majority Muslim population, but with a Hindu king who was unpopular and oppressive. The king, Hari Singh, did not want to side with either India or Pakistan, but when a spontaneous incursion - supported by the Pakistani government - took place, he asked for help from the Indian army. Thus, he also agreed to make Kashmir a part of India by signing the instrument of accession. The very method by which this transfer took place lays the foundation for criticism from Pakistan's side.[5]

Initially it was determined that the people of Kashmir should decide its future. But this promise was not fulfilled. In 1949, Article 370 was established. This granted most governing powers to Kashmiri's except critical powers such as defense, foreign affairs, currency and communication. Kashmir was given its own constitution and flag and the Kashmiri Assembly was allowed to decide which Indian laws should be applied to Kashmir. Initially, therefore, Kashmir's Indian identity was not problematic for the Kashmiri's themselves.[6]

However, the autonomy that Kashmir enjoyed became a problem for the central government. Hence, in 1953 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru removed the Prime Minister of Kashmir and whittled down Article 370, drastically limiting Kashmiri autonomy. The discontent the people had felt for their previous ruler - the king - was now transferred to the Indian central government, which was once again oppressing and mistreating them. Hence resentment began to fester.[7]

In addition to the dissatisfaction felt by the Kashmiris, the Indian government is also faced with Pakistani opposition to Indian rule over Kashmir. And thus, ever since partition, there has been mounting tension between the two states as they both want to exert control over the whole of Jammu and Kashmir.

It was the Indian government's hard-line control over elections in 1987, however - where candidates as well as counting agents were beaten - that ultimately instigated a violent turn to this conflict. Kashmiri youth began to cross the border into Pakistan to get trained and armed, and hence began the military insurgency that continues today.[8]

Recent Events

In June 2008, the government - consisting of the Kashmiri People's Democratic Party ruling with Congress - collapsed after its decision to cede land in Kashmir to Hindu pilgrims. This sparked mass protests against Indian rule and resulted in two months of uproar and the largest anti-Indian demonstrations since the early 1990s.[9]

Similarly, tensions between India and Pakistan escalated after the Mumbai attacks in November 26-28, 2008 when it became clear that Pakistan-based militants were involved via the Kashmiri group Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. India was then at war-level security. On November 30 Pakistani President Zardari urged India to adopt a joint approach to fighting the militants. Prior to the attacks, on November 22, Zardari had hinted at a "no first use" nuclear weapons policy and proposed closer contact across the LOC by lowering visa restrictions.[10]

After the Mumbai attacks Pakistan cut back its support for Pakistani Islamist militants fighting in Kashmir. This caused the insurgency to decline: it claimed approximately 540 lives in 2008 compared with 4,500 in 2001. But the stand-off between India and Pakistan, resulting from the terrorist attacks instigated by those very Pakistani militants, is threatening to undermine this progress.[11]

Simultaneously, the phased state assembly elections in Indian-administered Kashmir, which began on November 17, ended on December 24 with 60 percent overall turnout amidst a heavy security crackdown by the central government and several clashes between security forces and separatists.[12] The elections were seen as a victory for democracy. Though ideally Kashmiris would like to secede, their participation is testament to their realizing the importance of elections in facilitating a better and more representative state government.[13]

In addition, India is preparing for a general election, due by May. The recent attacks in Mumbai and the ensuing tension were therefore exacerbated by politicians vying for voter support and officials blaming one another for the mistakes made in handling the crisis. For now, however, as neither side is likely to gain from fighting, and because both India and Pakistan realize that this dispute requires careful negotiation, war seems unlikely.[14]



Kashmir has borders in India, Pakistan and China. Two of its regions are controlled by Pakistan - Azad and the mountainous northern territories - while three regions - Jammu, Ladakh and the Kashmir valley - are controlled by India. Of the three regions India controls, it is only the Kashmir valley that has a majority Muslim population. Ladakh is predominantly Buddhist, while Jammu once had a Muslim majority, but due to communal violence in 1947 and 1948, today has a Dogra Hindu majority. Both countries want control over Jammu and Kashmir in its entirety.[15]


Kashmir is heavily dependent on subsidies from the Indian government - needing subsidies even to pay official salaries - and therefore economic development is untenable.[16] Due to the on-going crisis and the economic blockade imposed by the Jammu agitation, the local economy is in shatters and tourism, which has otherwise been important for generating incomes, has dwindled. Also, Kashmir's natural resources are exploited and the benefits are reaped by other parts of India. Hydroelectric plants in Kashmir, for instance, generate a large amount of electricity that is exported to other Indian states, while Kashmir itself suffers from debilitating power shortages. The large deployment of troops further impacts economic activities as it restricts crucial movement between fields and the market.[17]


India and Pakistan both believe that they have a rightful claim to Kashmir. Kashmiri's themselves are divided between being pro-India, pro-Pakistan and wanting to be independent from both countries. Hindu Fundamentalists have used terrorist attacks by Kashmiri militants to retaliate against Muslims all over India, via incidents such as those that took place in Mumbai in 1992 and Gujarat in 2002.


The primary parties involved in this conflict are India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people (some pro-Pakistan, some pro-independence, some pro-India). Secondary actors include the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the U.K. at the time of partition, China - which supports Pakistan in an attempt to balance against India - and Islamist fighters from various countries who have declared the conflict a Muslim cause. Third parties to this conflict include the United Nations, the World Bank and at times the United States, though all three have maintained a distance from the conflict in recent years.

Overall there is very little third party intervention in this conflict, especially due to India's aversion to 'outside interference'.[18] In fact, the international community enters the issue mainly as a result of the UN resolutions of 1948-49 and also because of the water treaty that the World Bank helped implement.[19]


Interest Based

At the heart of this conflict is a confrontation between two nationalisms.[20] For Pakistan, the belief is that Muslims will be oppressed under Hindu rule and therefore need their own state. Since Kashmir is predominantly Muslim, Pakistan believes it should belong to them. Moreover, Kashmir has to be won to justify the religious moral significance of Pakistan's nationhood.[21]

India's identity, in contrast, hinges on a strong belief in secularism. Kashmir is seen as a smaller Pakistan, and therefore the government believes that having Kashmir under its control will give credence to its secular beliefs.[22] Kashmir has thus "become hostage to these bitterly contending nationalities".[23]

Identity Based

This conflict is also rooted in identity, based on geographic location, religion, language and culture. It is the clash of these enduring identities that makes the conflict so persistent. There is a confrontation between Hindus and Muslims, spiritual Islam, radical Islam and secularism and central government control versus self government.

Rights Based

The demand for rights is also central to this dispute. The political autonomy that Kashmir did enjoy early on was destroyed by the central government which has instead imposed a hegemonic control on the state of Jammu and Kashmir.[24] Hence, the current demand is for a three choice referendum which would include independence, apart from the choice of acceding to Pakistan or India.[25] Due to the large scale presence of Indian troops in Kashmir the local people's public and private lives are heavily controlled and regulated, impinging on their freedom of movement and their ability to carry out daily activities. Currently, civil rights and political liberties are virtually non-existent.[26] Past elections have been plagued by fraud and intimidation and democratic institutions and processes have repeatedly been "subverted and permanently retarded".[27]

In addition, Kashmiris are struggling to meet their basic needs, such as healthcare, education and water, the lack of which breeds further resentment and desperation. Finally, human rights violations by insurgents and also by the Indian army are widespread. War crimes and crimes against humanity are common, while redress for these abuses is severely lacking or non-existent.[28]

Resource Based

Water is one of the most contested resources in Kashmir. As per the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960 signed between India and Pakistan - at a time when both countries directly ruled their occupied areas - the three rivers which traverse J&K were given to Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan is entirely dependent on water basins which are in India held areas. Last year Pakistan complained that water flow was reduced by India in order to fill water for a dam India was constructing in its held area called the Baglihar project. The matter went to the World Bank and was resolved, but problems remain. As a consequence of the treaty, people of J&K, as upper riparians, were denied the right to water.[29]

Also, numerous restrictions were placed on the use of water for irrigation and for harnessing power by the IWT. So despite having significant hydroelectric potential, Kashmir lags behind the rest of India in its energy production. Thus, even where the state has a real advantage it is paradoxically dependent on outside sources to meet 80 percent of its requirements. And while some hydroelectric projects are being taken on, their high cost could compel the state to export power to service the debt, resulting in little improvement for J&K.[30]

Similarly, land is of critical importance in Kashmir. Currently, the law in J&K restricts ownership of land by non-state subjects. In order to circumvent this rule, others claim that in order to strengthen the tourism sector, this law should be removed. This is despite the fact that the tourism sector is not the backbone of the economy that these opponents claim it to be. Furthermore, land rights have been heavily impinged upon as civilian land has been occupied by the Indian security forces. Approximately 250,000 acres of state land have been encroached on with a market value of Rs 25,000 crore. When this was regularized, it was done so at a fraction of its actual value.[31]


In addition to issues of interests, identities, rights and resources, fear is central to this conflict. Fear of people belonging to another religion having a different value system that threatens one's own, as well as fear concerning the loss of control or the loss of power. This fear has paralyzed progress towards peace as it works against the one ingredient which is essential for positive change: trust.

Triggering Events

There are three critical events that triggered the current violent insurgency. The first took place in 1953, when Nehru removed the PM of Kashmir - due to his outspoken assertion of autonomy - and then whittled down Article 370 to the extent that Kashmiris lost much of their autonomy.[32] This gave rise to deep-seated resentment toward the central government by the Kashmiris.

The second event was the election in 1987. When opposition Muslim Front Candidates were robbed of seats and counting agents and candidates were beaten tensions rose in Kashmir. Many Kashmiri youth then started to cross over to Pakistani territory to be trained and armed. This gave rise to the Kashmir insurgency which was backed by popular support from within Kashmir and from Pakistan.[33]. Prior to this the conflict had been mainly inter-state, but now the Kashmiris themselves got involved.[34]

The Indian Government tainted and stunted political institutions in Kashmir, leaving few channels open for Kashmiris to express their discontent and dissent. This was exacerbated by the intolerant behavior of the army. Pakistan thereby began to achieve support for proxy war and hence tensions became militarized.[35]

The third is a combination of two events: the bombing of Parliament in New Delhi and the bombing of the State Assembly in Srinagar in 2001. These events resulted in a military build-up and instigated a cut off in diplomacy and transportation between India and Pakistan. India has since insisted on an end to Pakistani support for terrorism in order to negotiate, while Pakistan continues to deny such involvement and fears that without violence there would be no need for India to negotiate at all. Adding to the intensity of the situation is the fact that nuclear weapons are used as subtle threat.[36]


India and Pakistan are deeply polarized as they are both trying to further their own strategic interest, rather than considering what is in the best interest of the Kashmiri's.[37] India sees the conflict as a Pakistani proxy war, while Pakistan sees it as an indigenous quest for self determination.[38] Furthermore, there is a clash between what the majority of the Kashmiri people want - independence - and what the militants want - union with Pakistan.[39] Because all primary parties to the conflict have such starkly opposing desires, finding a middle ground for compromise has proved cumbersome.


The conflict in Kashmir has been going on for more than 60 years now. During this time there have been ebbs as well as tides in the tensions between parties, but there have nevertheless been numerous actions and events that have caused the conflict to spiral. To begin with, the Indian occupation of Kashmir has facilitated the process of mobilizing people around their identity as Muslims.[40] People, who may otherwise have based their identity on language or culture, were thereby drawn into a community based on religion that stretches beyond the borders of the conflict.

In addition, Pakistan's fight over Kashmir has legitimized military dictatorship and draconian anti-terror laws in the country hardening the stance against India.[41] Simultaneously, India has introduced sweeping anti-terror laws and which discriminate against Muslims and suspended the constitution in 'disturbed areas' without parliamentary oversight, making Kashmiris feel more alienated and desperate and pushing them further towards their Muslim identity in order to seek respite.[42] Youth, in particular, turn to Islamic militancy as venue for addressing their needs and grievances since they fail to find any other recourse for their political dissatisfaction.[43]

As is clear from the elections in 1987, unfair election practices exacerbate the dispute. The central government has repeatedly thwarted the political will of Kashmiris, alienating the common people. The government is thus pushing the Kashmiri people further away, making them view secession as the only viable option for peace and justice.[44]

The conduct of the conflict also leads to its perpetuation. Militant attacks and low intensity conflicts are designed to force India to accept a solution palatable to Pakistan, making India even more reluctant to accede to anything until Pakistan admits to sponsoring terrorism and stops doing so. The Indian government has deployed over 600,000 soldiers as the only representatives of the government in the state. The population of Kashmir is 13 million, making this the highest troop to population concentration in the world (in 2003).[45] Minimal use of lethal force is thereby compensated by increased manpower, a nature of warfare that is more pervasive and intimidating.[46]

Violations by the army further perpetuate entrenched distrust and contempt for Indian government.[47] The conduct of internal war is to "isolate the conflict zone from external material assistance for optimal utilisation of army resources".[48] In effect this is a method used to control the population, stifling their will, but instead it only fuels their resentment. Moreover, in the name of fighting insurgents, Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir are hounded outside the territory when travelling within the country making them feel even more vulnerable.[49]

In addition, security forces occupy 90,000 acres of farm and orchard land and 1500 buildings and the quest for land continues to grow. Over 20 years 70,000 people have died, 60,000 are in detention, 20,000 have been tortured, 8,000 have simply disappeared and 60,000 people have been denied a passport. The resentment is therefore building up and spilling over into the public sphere as people are overcoming their fear of the security forces. There is a blurring of distinction for Indian forces between fighting the enemy and fighting their own people. In addition to increased resentment, the separatist sentiment was consolidated by the transfer of land to the Amarnath board, the occupation of civilian land by security forces and the economic blockade imposed by the Jammu agitation.[50]

External actors and events have also instigated a spiraling of the conflict. The violent and Islamic fundamentalist aspect of the insurgency was, for instance, reinforced by the success of the Palestinian intifada as well as the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan which gave Mujahedeen's a new cause to fight for. Similarly, the U.S. promise of military aid to Pakistan in 1956 created Indian doubts over UN Commission mediation since 18 members were American, debilitating the process.[51] Also, during the Cold War, Moscow supported India while Washington supported Pakistan, hardening the stance of each country on Kashmir. Hence, at the time, any prospect that the UN could play a useful role in resolving dispute was quashed.[52]

The global war on terrorism has increased international talks, but is has also hardened Indian and Pakistani stances, particularly since both countries have acquired nuclear weapons. Pakistan feels it can continue to support militancy since the U.S. won't do anything until Afghanistan and Iraq are settled. India is also emboldened in its characterization of the dispute with Pakistan as merely a terrorism problem, strengthening a case for preemptive action.[53]

Finally, Climate change is likely to aggravate the problem, but due to the on-going conflict, environmental concerns are blatantly neglected. The Kolahoi glacier, for instance, is slowly melting. If this persists it will result in water scarcity and a decrease in fertile land, exacerbating the two resource issues that are already at the heart of this dispute.[54]


Widespread stereotyping has sowed the seeds for the polarized situation that exists today on the issue of Kashmir. Elites from both India and Pakistan stereotype the opposite country. This is the result of misappropriation of information in the education system as well as in the media. Schools can sustain conflict through the perpetuation of religious or ethnic division, through discriminatory or preferential practices and through biased or restricted curriculum.[55]. History textbooks, for example, distort history to reinforce a particular image, providing an enduring basis for hatred. Because education often consists of rote memorization with little emphasis on critical thinking, children are socialized at a young age by what are often blatant factual errors.[56]. Similarly, mass media present few programs that humanize the other by reflecting true realities and similarities, focusing instead on stark differences and problems. Therefore, media, which could otherwise serve to educate a misinformed public, fail to embrace this opportunity and instead perpetuate the flawed socialization process.[57]

Conflict Regulation Potential

There is potential for change in regards to Kashmir, but this is hindered by several internal and external factors that escalate the conflict.

Internal Factors

First, stereotyping has given rise to perception and expectations that place India and Pakistan at opposite ends of the spectrum with little chance of finding common ground. Instead, Hindu fundamentalists are gaining ground using the insurgency as an excuse to carry out prejudiced actions, such as using that the Amarnath Yatra to promote religious tourism, while in reality it was a way to acquire land and promote nationalism.[58] Also, political parties and extremists, such as Shiv Sena, continue to demonize Muslims and Pakistanis creating a rift between the public in both countries. This is further exacerbated by the strict visa rules that prevent travel between the countries and the fact that there is very little contact between people from both countries as well as with people from Kashmir. Hence dialogue across conflict lines is greatly restricted, impinging transformation.[59]

In addition, the process of negotiation is limited. Indo-Pak talks continue to exclude Kashmiris from the discussion table despite their clear role in the process.[60] The current peace process will therefore continue to be seen as illegitimate, as it doesn't address the issue of the presence of hostile security forces among civilians.[61] In terms of the Kashmiris, they lack clear leadership, and so there is no concerted, political effort that can balance against the Indian and Pakistani governments.[62] Much of this is rooted in the fact that while Kashmiris are tired of violence, there are few legal or political alternatives available to them. Moreover, discussions are restricted to talks between government officials and elites, disregarding middle-level and grassroots actors altogether.

The current situation in Kashmir is such that grievances and problems are not met constructively leaving them to fester and grow into desperation and bitterness. The legal and administrative systems are incompetent and hence justice is greatly restricted. There is also a lack of government transparency which breeds suspicion and frustration.[63]. As non-state actors, the abuses carried out by the insurgents go unchecked and the Indian security forces in turn, though they are answerable, are given special powers and immunity by the government, essentially ridding them of responsibility of their actions.[64] Indeed, India is not a signatory to Geneva Protocol III.[65]

Finally, for Pakistan as well as for India, the cost-benefit analysis favors inertia. The issue is so intransigent that exerting resources, time and effort on resolving it, is far more costly than letting it continue but under a certain degree of control.[66] Moreover, India is complacent, because militancy strengthens the central government's control over Kashmir. As long as militants continue to instigate violent resistance, the government can justify the heavy security force presence in Kashmir. Thus, despite the volatility of the situation, its continuation ensures central government control over Kashmir, which would be more questionable if a peace settlement was reached.[67]

External Factors

As mentioned, earlier, there are several external factors that further complicate the conflict in Kashmir. First, the conflict has now stretched beyond Kashmir and beyond India and Pakistan and become a central cause for Islamists. Islamic fundamentalists in almost every part of the world are working to promote the spread of Islamism. Hence militants in Kashmir are increasingly neither Indian nor Pakistani and instead consist of Islamists from various countries. This has expanded the conflict, and it has also heightened violence as these fighters have brought with them tenets of Jihadi warfare. Because these are non-state actors, there is little possibility to hold them accountable for their actions.[68]

In addition, Pakistan is itself vulnerable to activities of radical militant groups. The government is heavily reliant on the military to withstand pressures from these groups, yet the Pakistani military and intelligence agency are often also collaborating with some of these groups. So it is questionable whether they will be able to curb militant activities in Kashmir.[69]

External influence is in itself often intrusive and destructive. China is, for instance, exploiting Indo-Pak enmity. The Chinese government is aligned with Pakistan, providing Pakistan with military wherewithal, as a strategic and economic investment to put pressure on India. China sees India as a peer competitor and major strategic rival in Asia and is hence manipulating the conflict in Kashmir to further its own economic and strategic goals. The Chinese government is particularly alarmed at U.S. talks of using India as counterweight to China, increasing its eagerness to limit Indian advancement.[70]

The U.S. role has thus far been fairly noncommittal. U.S. interest in the Kashmir conflict goes beyond Kashmir itself. Washington is concerned about nuclear nonproliferation, controlling the Taliban and general peace between India and Pakistan. However, due to the high stakes involved if the U.S. were to take too active a role in South Asia - in terms of Pakistan being an important military ally and India an important trade partner - the government has tended to refrain from taking on an active mediating role.[71]

Kashmir, therefore, presents a dilemma for the international community. International actors are wary of intervening all too obtrusively, especially since India is so averse to external interference. Yet, due to the lack of a concerted international mediation effort in Kashmir, there is not enough pressure to push India towards working out a democratic solution which meets with the aspirations of the people, and can be ascertained through a transparent, peaceful and democratic process.[72]

Available Third Parties

As mentioned previously, India maintains that Kashmir is a bilateral issue that precludes third party intervention.[73] External actors are also hesitant to get involved due to the intensity of the situation and the risks that involvement could imply for their own economic or political system. Moreover, the conflict in Kashmir does not represent the typical peacebuilding scenario for many reasons. First, it is both intrastate and interstate in its nature. Second, India is already a democratic country, so introducing democracy or market economy, which are otherwise common strategies, are not useful in this situation. And lastly, both countries have nuclear weapons, making the situation highly volatile.

Nevertheless, external actors could play a significant role in alleviating this conflict. At a basic level they could observe and monitor elections to ensure that they are fair and reliable. In addition, third parties could facilitate Track II and Track III talks. Currently, talks occur mainly at the elite level, but these are limited in their scope and as is clear by their progress thus far, they have not been very successful. By including retired bureaucrats and civil society, however, it is more likely that the negative stereotypes underlying the animosity between parties to the conflict can be broken down, initiating a more sustainable dialogue towards transformation.[74]

Clearly, however, no viable solution to this conflict will be reached unless Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris are involved in the process and satisfied with the solution.

Current Situation

The recent elections in Kashmir for the state legislature play a small role in instigating change, especially in terms of the demilitarization of the state. But as the Kashmiris themselves recognized, which is evidenced by a voter turnout of 60 percent, participating in this election does offer a critical venue for tackling practical grievances. The state legislature, though limited in its reach, does have the power to build roads, schools, health centres and to create jobs and can restrain the harassment and brutality of the security forces. Hence, this process "provides material succor to a population which has suffered immensely for over 2 decades".[75]

The elections themselves were, however, flawed. A total of 1354 candidates stood for just 87 seats, making voting by the public arduous and the process unnecessarily complex. Also, despite the fact that militants halted all activities obstructing people from voting, the government had still sent 538 companies of central para-military forces and 60-70 companies of the Central Reserve Police Force for election duty. The army presence was hence grossly disproportionate to the need for security and hence merely served to curtail movement and actions by imposing curfews and patrolling the streets.[76]

It is believed by some that these recent elections could be catalyst for a shift in the equation. The Kashmiri people's nonviolent assertion for aazadi (independence) persuaded militants to silence their guns and their use of a legal venue to address their concerns, despite years of exploitation, could sow the seeds for a less violent approach to the conflict. Fittingly, this would be a counter balance to the 1987 elections which was a catalyst for militancy.[77]

This will, of course, depend on whether public concerns and aspirations are adequately addressed. This includes not just basic needs - such as schools and health care - but also integral needs including the use of water resources and access to land. If there is to be constructive and positive change, public support is integral.[78]



The conflict in Kashmir has been going on for over 60 years. Clearly, there is no simple solution to the problems that exist, and because the conflict is not just territorial, a military solution is out of the question. Addressing the true elements of the conflict involves striving for justice, truth, peace, mercy and ultimately reconciliation.[79]

Truth relates to acknowledging the past, the rights and the wrongs, the decisions made, actions taken and their consequences on all involved. Justice and mercy are then integral to providing closure to grievances that arise from these truths, in the form of legal retribution, simple acknowledgment of wrongdoing, mercy for Kashmiris who joined the militancy by recognizing the concerns and circumstances that led them to turn violent and assistance to the people to help them rebuild their lives and livelihoods and move forward. Peace is related not only to a ceasefire but also to the reestablishing of relationships across the various borders that this conflict entails - Pakistani-controlled-Kashmir and Indian-controlled-Kashmir, Pakistan and India, J&K and the central government and J&K and Pakistani government. These four elements are therefore ongoing processes that enhance each other and provide the integral basis for long-term reconciliation which is essential for sustainable change.[80]

Change will be incremental and will stretch over a long period of time before a substantial metamorphosis of the conflict can take place. This process in itself can, however, result in small-scale benefits and improvements that can be reaped before the ultimate transformation is complete. Hence, I propose seven initial goals that could initiate a constructive transformation process.

To begin with, there is a need for significant self-rule to be re-instated in J&K, including a provision for autonomy within autonomy for Jammu and Ladakh. As opposed to a plebiscite - which at this point is obsolete as it promotes a winner take all approach that could merely fuel further conflict - autonomy for J&K would be constructive as it would give Kashmiris themselves a stronger voice. It is their lack of voice and their inability to influence actions and decisions that shape their lives that originally led to the insurgency. By addressing these needs - via providing the important civil and political rights entailed by autonomy - the Indian government could eradicate, or at least subdue, one of the most contentious causes of this conflict, even if this is limited to the Indian side.[81]

Autonomy does, however, have its pitfalls. While it has been successful in the past - before Article 370 was whittled down - the current situation has altered the circumstances necessary for its success. Hence, the state of J&K should be awarded autonomy and also, the regions within J&K - Jammu, the Kashmir valley and Ladakh - with their varied religious makeup should also be granted a degree of autonomy within this autonomy. For the transition period at least, state institutions and the state government should be built on inclusive power sharing by representatives from all three regions.[82]

Furthermore, civil and political rights need to be supplemented with socio-economic rights and basic human rights. This is particularly important in regards to land and water resources and in regards to the human rights abuses that have taken place. In order to strengthen the state economy and to protect the dignity of the Kashmiri people, infringements on land rights - especially by the Indian army - and the mismanagement of water resources need to be stopped. While the army is not likely to return all land, a decrease in the imposing troop presence in Kashmir could be feasible if violence decreased, as it is hoped to do due to autonomy. Similarly, water needs serious attention not just in terms of access and productive use of water resources, but also in terms of the environmental damage being done due to global warming that can worsen the conflict. Improving access to land and mobility for farmers to sell their produce, as well as making better use of water for electricity generation and reducing pollution and environmental damage are, therefore, critical for the strengthening of the local economy and society.

Tackling human rights abuses is another important goal. With the excessive war crimes and crimes against humanity that have taken place during this conflict there is a need for a venue to adequately handle grievances and provide justice for those who have suffered. As long people feel they have been wronged and see no legal way to deal with the consequences they are likely to turn to more desperate measures in order to handle their grief. By accepting human rights law and humanitarian law, and shaping national laws accordingly - for instance, if the Indian army was to accept Geneva Protocol III - there would be more room for legal resolutions to problems, preventing them from fueling the conflict.[83] Once again, providing a legal avenue for people to enhance their voice is a critical goal.

In addition to negotiations between the Indian government and the Kashmiris, negotiations also need to take place between Pakistan and the Kashmiris, between Kashmiris on both sides of the border and between Pakistan and India.[84] These dialogues can and should take many forms. In terms of interactions between India and Pakistan, discussion should center on the development of cross-border cooperation between India-controlled-Kashmir and Pakistan-controlled-Kashmir, including a mutual ceasefire. Ultimately, the goal would be to transform the LOC from being a rigid separator to a permeable border that allows for cultural and economic exchange.[85] This would, however, also require that cross-border ties are enhanced in the subcontinent as a whole based on shared economic and security interests.[86] Therefore there is a need to strive for a structured and persistent peace process, in contrast to the joint declarations that characterize the process thus far.[87]

However, while Track I dialogues are important, and negotiations between the central government and local population are essential, this is not enough. There is also a need for constructive dialogue that takes the shape of Track II and Track III talks, moving beyond the elites. This brings multiple non-state actors into the transformation process making it more comprehensive. Track II would, for instance, involve businesses, NGOs, newspapers etc. that are able to discuss issues without the polarized nature of the conflict impeding dialogue. Such discussions have the potential to give rise to concrete small steps that can be taken to enhance peace, where elites tend to focus only on big changes.[88]

Similarly, public awareness and involvement is critical. Public opinion, articulated by independent and private media outlets, has become a critical part of foreign policy in India today.[89] Currently, the public in both India and Pakistan are ill-informed giving rise to dangerous stereotyping that exacerbates the conflict. Integral to any move towards betterment, therefore, is better educating the public and creating more opportunities for people from either side of the border to interact so as to decrease the rift that has emerged between civilians in India and Pakistan.

International actors also play an important role in this process, but it is critical that involvement remains limited and subtle. Due to the inertia that plagues relations between India and Pakistan, there is a clear need for outside help. But India remains highly antagonistic towards external involvement. The growth of the Indian economy has made India an increasingly important player in the international community, and this could potentially make decision-makers more open to abiding by international norms in order to acquire recognition and status. However, sovereignty is still seen as supreme, and hence the government is likely to continue to remain resistant to external involvement.

In addition, third party intervention can be arduous when there is a stark difference in the power between parties to a conflict allies may sometimes be as big a problem as enemies, as is the case with China for instance.[90] In addition to border conflicts between India and China in the past, China sees India as its main economic rival in Asia. Therefore, to further the state's own interest, the Chinese have provided Pakistan with nuclear bombs, uranium, nuclear plants and nuclear delivery systems.[91] Pakistan in essence provides Beijing with a counterbalance to India.

Under these circumstances, increased international engagement will only be beneficial if it is indirect. The international community can help via subtle mediation such as human rights agreements, by pushing for article 370, ending military support and by monitoring and overseeing elections.[92] The UN, in this situation appears to be unsuited for the task, especially due to its lack of legitimacy after the previous UN peacebuilding mission in the early years of the conflict. The only area in which the UN could play an important part is, perhaps, in regards to election monitoring. Instead the United States would be the most plausible alternative as the country has leverage over Pakistan and influence - in terms of strategic and economic relations - over India. However, this involvement must be discreet and behind the scenes.[93]

These intermediate goals will by no means resolve the conflict or ensure that it ends. Instead, they would serve to steer the conflict on another course, one that is less violent and destructive and that could potentially lead to constructive change.

Avenues for Change

There are several obstacles to reaching the goals mentioned above. Firstly, as the length of this conflict indicates, India and Pakistan have a contentious history that continues to taint their relations. Because Kashmir represents a crucial element of their national identity, this deep-rooted historical conflict is resilient to change. Second, the relationship between the Indian central government and the population of Kashmir is also very troubled. The Kashmiris, in general, do not see Indian rule as legitimate, and therefore the governments continued efforts to exert control over the state have only increased resentment and resistance. Third, political allegiances are diverse and complex within Indian-controlled-Kashmir. The population is divided into those who side with Pakistan, those who side with India and those who strive for independence. Therefore, arriving at a solution that meets all interests is extremely cumbersome.[94]

Nevertheless, a process for change can be generated and the aforementioned goals can be reached if the appropriate channels are utilized. To date, efforts have mostly been centered on Track I negotiations between governments and these have yet to result in any substantial peace agreement. It would therefore, be more productive to utilize Diamond and McDonald's Multi-track Diplomacy which creates a truly multifaceted dialogue, involving a variety of actors.[95] These different tracks to diplomacy, combined with multiple theories of change could together initiate a dynamic process of transformation.[96]

In order to meet the goal of autonomy, government involvement is essential. This would involve working with political elites to change their perception of interests. Because Kashmir is integral to national identity in India and Pakistan there is a need for framing the issue in a different light. While little concrete progress has been made so far in this respect, both India and Pakistan have increasingly realized the need for a resolution to this conflict for their national self-interest and hence the situation appears ripe for change. India aspires to become a global power in terms of its growing economy, but also due to its democratic identity. The Kashmir conflict is therefore a distinct blemish on its record, causing diplomatic embarrassment and exhausting human and financial resources that could be used elsewhere. For Pakistan, it is becoming increasingly difficult to continue to support the insurgency due to the regional and military context of being an important U.S. ally in the war against terror, and because it has had dangerous impacts on the country itself.[97]

Both countries are therefore seemingly ready to consider negotiating an end to the conflict. In addition, J&K autonomy is not a foreign concept, it has worked in the past and Article 370 still exists on paper. The tools for instituting autonomy, therefore, already exist. Such a negotiation would have to involve not only representatives from India and Pakistan, but also from Kashmir. Pakistan may not willingly agree to allow J&K to remain a part of India and this is certainly a complication. Also, due to the multitude of political affiliations in Kashmir, all Kashmiris may not be too happy with autonomy either. And India will most definitely be reluctant to give up control in the valley.

There is, however, a chance that this could offer a common ground which no party is completely happy with, but which they may accept as a short-term solution as it would meet at least part of their needs. For India, Kashmir would remain part of Indian territory ensuring India's secular identity. Kashmiris would gain more influence over their state affairs and have more power to counterbalance central government control. For Pakistan, though this part of Kashmir would be lost to India, it is likely that cooperation and trade across the border with Pakistan-controlled-territory would increase and Islamist forces within the country would be weakened. And for all three parties, decreased violence would nurture economic, social and political stabilization and growth.

Related to the issue of granting autonomy, is establishing institutions that support this autonomy. As a short-term solution during the transitional phase, power sharing will be important to build legitimacy for the state government. Jammu, Ladakh and the Kashmir valley are three distinct regions within the state of J&K with different religious majorities and therefore different identities. Hence, it is critical that each region within the state is given the same degree of power and status to avoid initiating a new conflict.[98] This process may require limited assistance by professional conflict resolution personnel in order to ensure that the power sharing agreement is thorough and fair.

Upholding socio-economic and human rights present a second complex goal. This would, once again, involve the government and conflict resolution specialists, but it is also vital that it incorporates civil society who can help advocate for the local population. This would require social and transitional justice mechanisms.[99] Social justice would address land and water issues not just in terms of distribution and access but also in terms of environmental degradation. This must be tackled, or else the resulting environmental damage will likely fuel a new conflict.

Transitional justice, in turn, would address issues related to human rights abuses. In Kashmir this is a huge problem because of the sheer numbers of those who have been detained, disappeared, tortured and killed. Due to the immunity awarded to the Indian army, punishment of soldiers who commit these abuses is often lessened or non-existent. Similarly, the incompetent legal and administrative systems in place make legal avenues for recourse very weak. There are about 300 cases pending at the moment, as judges are hesitant to rule for fear of being transferred or because their appointment was politically motivated. Finally, the non-state militants involved in this conflict complicate the justice process further as they are not held accountable to the same rules that states are. Even when legal avenues are pursued to punish non-state actors it is often the individual, rather than the group that is punished. Hence, violent acts by these actors are not necessarily averted and the group itself is not significantly weakened, indeed it may be strengthened by the publicity it receives.[100]

Providing transitional justice will, therefore, be a cumbersome and highly sensitive process for all those involved and requires a long-term commitment to establishing stable institutions that can oversee and implement the process. The nature of the crimes also makes this an issue that could severely tarnish India's image in the international community. Therefore it is integral that it is handled domestically, at least initially, without direct international actor involvement. The impetus for such a measure to be taken would have to come from the public and indirectly, from the international community.

The public supported by civil society would play a predominant role in putting pressure on the government to take an initiative. The international community, in turn, could participate by holding the Indian government accountable in the international arena and instating and promoting norms that highlight the importance of upholding and protecting human rights. This would give the Indian government an incentive - the pursuit of soft power - to take the necessary steps to provide transitional justice.[101] In addition, international actors could help by providing funding which would be critical to this process and by acting as consultants for the private citizens, NGOs and grassroots groups working on the ground.

The fourth goal, conducting dialogues between multiple parties to the conflict, would involve a variety of actors. For dialogues between India and Pakistan, government officials would be the predominant actors. This is the predominant shape of negotiations to date, and clearly it has not been very successful. An essential dimension that needs to be included is, therefore, representatives of the Kashmiri people. This would, once again, entail changing the political calculations involved in making decisions to encourage cooperation and recognition of mutual interests between India and Pakistan, and in extension the Kashmiris.

Peace through reconstruction is one feasible alternative for building a stable foundation for change. By building bridges between India and Pakistan and between parts of Kashmir, generating youth employment, and opening the J&K economy, the government could create a situation conducive to constructive and lasting change.[102]

Altering the nature of the LOC is also integral to a transformation of the conflict. These dialogues are, therefore, critical in altering the relationship between India and Pakistan and between the two parts of Kashmir, allowing for a soft border that enhances cooperation and downplaying the rigid permanency of the border that merely polarizes the parties to the conflict. In addition, the dialogue between India and Pakistan needs to extend beyond Kashmir and focus on cooperation, economically and related to security concerns. Unless there is greater stability in the region as a whole, the Kashmir issue will remain a volatile issue. The international community could once again provide indirect support for this by encouraging peaceful negotiations and by rewarding positive behavior and progress.[103]

The fifth goal is intricately linked to the previous one. As mentioned, Track I diplomacy does have an important role to play in the peacebuilding process. It is, however, limited. The situation in Kashmir in particular illustrates the void that is created when the peace process is predominantly in the hands of the elite. Therefore, there is a need for dialogue among the various parties at the middle range and grassroots level as well. The former is particularly important because they have the ability to link their dialogues to those of the elites. Without collaboration between these levels there is little hope for a sustainable impact.

Middle range actors would, therefore, include businessmen, professionals and religious leaders for instance, from various sides of the conflict, whom would meet and discuss the problems at hand in a neutral environment conducive to stepping away from the polarization of the conflict. Their aim would be to attempt to establish a culture of peace that extends beyond borders, bringing to light the importance of issues such as poverty eradication, reducing social inequalities and promoting human rights. Lacking the constraint of being official actors, they will have more freedom to discuss alternative solutions and to suggest new paths to change. They could also work to establish healthy relationships and connections by breaking down isolation and prejudices, bringing the parties closer together so that they are more likely to reach an agreement.

Indeed, such ventures have already been implemented to a certain extent. Private U.S. organizations, such as the Ford Foundation, have often taken the lead in supporting cross-border dialogues, the most prominent being the Neemrana dialogue. Indian and Pakistani newspapers and NGOs have similarly taken the initiative to create discussions across conflict lines. In addition, groups, such as the Kashmir Study Group (KSG) founded by the Kashmiri-American businessman Farooq Kathwari, have made contributions to the process. KSG includes individuals who are academics, retired diplomats and members of Congress, amongst others, who have sponsored several meetings and conferences which involve all three primary parties to the conflict.[104]

While these efforts have failed to have a significant impact on government policy thus far, especially since many were tainted by the perception that they had close ties to the U.S. government, they have not been complete failures.[105] These efforts have at least proved that such Track II and Track III approaches are feasible and if maintained in the long-term, they could potentially result in more concrete changes. The key is to create a degree of acceptance and mutual respect between actors involved in Track I and Track II and III efforts so that words are actually put into action.

The goal of increasing public awareness is extremely important in this conflict. Because prejudices are so deeply ingrained in the societies in question, problems will persist unless change is made to the identity issues that lie at the heart of this conflict. For this purpose research, training and education play an important role as well as public opinion communication via the media. Education is an essential tool in the process of reconciliation because it is a truly long-term investment. Education material and practices have long been used to perpetuate misconstrued notions of the 'other', socializing people to believe that the 'other' is their enemy. But they can just as easily be used to spread realistic and positive images of the 'other'. Hence, ensuring that history and civics textbooks, for instance, present accurate information - not just in terms of history but also in terms of introducing students to the ordinary aspects of life in the other country so that the people become more relatable - and improving teacher training, so that teachers can encourage critical thinking rather than merely rote learning are integral to any peace process.[106] These efforts will ensure that children are socialized to approach conflicts, such as the one in Kashmir, with a more nuanced idea of what the issues are and the ability to see the resolution of conflicts arising from more than merely ceasefires and a winner-take-all scenario.

Moreover, education goes beyond the classroom and includes educating adults about issues as well. This would include workshops and training, often handled by middle-range actors and grassroots organizations, which raise consciousness and expose people to different points of view in a constructive manner.[107] Simply providing people with alternative perspectives, though difficult for some to accept at first, can create a space for reevaluating ingrained beliefs.

The media also plays a critical role in forming public awareness and shaping public attitudes. Currently, media portrayals often serve to accentuate the negative stereotypes that exist about other parties to the conflict and there is a lack of positive and humanistic reporting. By focusing instead on humanizing the issues and the conflict and by raising awareness about similarities as well as differences between the parties to the conflict, the media can play a distinct role in creating opportunities for peace. This is particularly pertinent due to the wide reach that the media has.

Because public opinion plays an increasing role in government decision-making, this goal is especially poignant. The government will be more likely to enforce changes if they are pressured by the public, whereas they are less likely to do so if the public remains complacent or advocates retaliation and aggression. Public opinion creates a foundation for future possibilities, so even if the other goals are not successful, achieving this goal will significantly improve prospects for peace in the future.

The last goal is increased involvement of the international community. This goal is linked to most of the other goals and is related to diplomacy, funding and mediation. The key to this involvement is that it needs to be indirect, overt impositions of peace agreements would be detrimental to the peace process. Indeed, since India is a democracy and has a market economy, the main approaches utilized by peacebuilding missions would not be applicable in this case. In addition, because the conflict is both inter-state and intra-state in nature it would be difficult for international actors to play a constructive role, except if they are able to appeal to India's interest in acquiring soft power or by linking their involvement to important economic incentives.

However, there is a need for international community involvement. International actors can help by resolving not to worsen the situation - by ending military support to either side of the conflict as was the case during the Cold War for instance - or by enhancing the situation so that it is more conducive to peace - by mediation that helps the actors in the conflict reach a mutual decision and to pressure parties to uphold that decision in the long-term. Hence, the role for international actors is not restricted to helping form peace agreements, instead they can be most useful by monitoring and overseeing the transition period so that it remains fairly stable and ensuring that decisions made in the peace accord are fulfilled and abided by. They should, in fact, remain distant from active involvement in the peace process and instead fill the void that exists for an enforcer, so that negotiations and declarations become more than empty words. Ideally, successful mediators will influence the process in such a manner that constructive decisions are made and the primary parties to the conflict believe that these decisions are their own.


The conflict in Kashmir is complex and it is entrenched in the very identity of the parties involved. After 60 years, with little progress and several highly volatile situations, a solution to the problem appears distant. But transformation does not. Despite continued tension, it has become apparent that both India and Pakistan are growing more concerned with finding a peaceful way to tackle this dispute and realizing the critical importance that this will have for their own self-interests. The Kashmiris themselves are becoming increasingly exhausted with the situation, longing for an end to their suffering, and yet they are still able to turn to legal avenues for weathering their grievances despite the disappointments of such efforts in the past. They still believe in the possibility of instigating change through non-violent means. The situation is hence ripe for a change of course.

By setting numerous incremental goals rather than merely focusing on the ultimate end goal of peace, which in itself is far from static, the peacebuilding process becomes more manageable and its success more realistic. The goals and methods to achieve them that are mentioned above are neither conclusive nor full-proof; they are merely a few critical stepping stones in this long-term venture. Importantly, however, whether these goals are reached or not, the process of striving for these goals itself impacts the course of the dispute and creates lasting change in the foundations for building peace. Due to the networks and partnerships that are created a stable basis for further progress is established. Ultimately, the most important tool for peacebuilding and reconciliation is the building and strengthening of relationships.[108] In pursuing dialogue, collaboration and the spread of information, this is likely to occur regardless of whether the goals themselves are fulfilled or not.

[1] Alexander Evans, "Why Peace Won't Come to Kashmir," Current History, Philadelphia: Apr 2001, Vol. 100, Iss. 645, 171, ProQuest: <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=70990603&Fmt=6&clientId=48347&R QT=309&VName=PQD>.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., 175.

[4] Gautam Navlakha, e-mail message to author, January 26, 2009.

[5] Shakti Bhatt, "State Terrorism vs. Jihad in Kashmir," Journal of Contemporary Asia, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: 2003. Vol. 33, Iss. 2, 216, ProQuest: <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=356112101&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[6] Kamal Chenoy, "Contending Nationalisms," Harvard International Review, Cambridge: Fall 2006, Vol. 28, Iss. 3, 24. ProQuest: <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1191682541&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& ;RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[7] Ibid., 24-25.

[8] Ibid., 25.

[9] "A Good Vote in the Angry Valley," The Economist, December, 30th, 2008. Retrieved on Jan/19/2008 from: <http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story-id=12868164>.

[10] International Crisis Group, "Kashmir," Crisis Group, Retrieved Jan/ 19/2008 from: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1268&l=1>.

[11] "A Good Vote in the Angry Valley," <http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story-id=12868164>.

[12] International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1268&l=1>.

[13] "A Good Vote in the Angry Valley," <http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story-id=12868164>.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Alexander Evans, "Why Peace Won't Come to Kashmir," 170, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=70990603&Fmt=6&clientId=48347&R QT=309&VName=PQD>.

[16] Ibid., 171.

[17] Gautam Navlakha, "State of Jammu and Kashmir's Economy," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 42, No. 40, October 06 - October 12, 2007, 4035-4037, <http://epw.in/uploads/articles/11105.pdf>.

[18] Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, "Kashmir: Fifty Years of Running in Place," In Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict, Ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2005), 295.

[19] Gautam Navlakha, e-mail message to author, January 26, 2009.

[20] Kamal Chenoy, "Contending Nationalisms," 24,

<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1191682541&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& amp;RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[21] Shakti Bhatt, "State Terrorism vs. Jihad in Kashmir," 216-217. <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=356112101&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Kamal Chenoy, "Contending Nationalisms," 24, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1191682541&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& ;RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[24] Sumantra Bose, "Kashmir," In Contested Lands, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 170.

[25] Gautam Navlakha, e-mail message to author, January 26, 2009.

[26] Sumantra Bose, "Kashmir," 171.

[27] Ibid., 170-171.

[28] Gautam Navlakha, e-mail message to author, January 26, 2009.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Gautam Navlakha, "State of Jammu and Kashmir's Economy," 4036-4037, <http://epw.in/uploads/articles/11105.pdf>.

[31] Ibid., 4035-4036.

[32] Kamal Chenoy, "Contending Nationalisms," 24-25, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1191682541&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& ;RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[33] Ibid., 25.

[34] Sumantra Bose, "Kashmir," In Contested Lands, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 178.

[35] Shakti Bhatt, "State Terrorism vs. Jihad in Kashmir," 218, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=356112101&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[36] Howard B. Schaffer et al., "Kashmir: Fifty Years of Running in Place," 301.

[37] Shakti Bhatt, "State Terrorism vs. Jihad in Kashmir," 216-217, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=356112101&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[38] Alexander Evans, "Why Peace Won't Come to Kashmir," 171, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=70990603&Fmt=6&clientId=48347&R QT=309&VName=PQD>.

[39] Ibid., 174-175.

[40] Gautam Navlakha, e-mail message to author, January 26, 2009.

[41] Kamal Chenoy, "Contending Nationalisms," 25, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1191682541&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& ;RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Shakti Bhatt, "State Terrorism vs. Jihad in Kashmir," 221, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=356112101&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[44] Ibid., 218.

[45] Ibid., 219.

[46] Gautam Navlakha, "Doctrine for Sub-conventional Operations: A Critique," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 42, No. 14, April 07 - April 13, 2007, 1244-1245, <http://epw.in/uploads/articles/10465.pdf>.

[47] Shakti Bhatt, "State Terrorism vs. Jihad in Kashmir," 219, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=356112101&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[48] Gautam Navlakha, "Doctrine for Sub-conventional Operations: A Critique," 1244-1245, <http://epw.in/uploads/articles/10465.pdf>.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Gautam Navlakha, "Resentment Persists in Kashmir," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 06, February 09 - February 15, 2008, 13-14, <http://epw.in/uploads/articles/11744.pdf>. Gautam Navlakha, e-mail message to author, January 26, 2009.

[51] Shakti Bhatt, "State Terrorism vs. Jihad in Kashmir," 218, 220, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=356112101&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[52] Howard B. Schaffer et al., "Kashmir: Fifty Years of Running in Place," 304-305.

[53] Ibid., 311.

[54] "How Green Was My Valley?" The Economist, October 23, 2008, Retrieved on Jan/25/2009 from: <http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story-id=12480378>

[55] Carrie Antal, "Reflections on Religious Nationalism, Conflict and Schooling in Developing Democracies: India and Israel in Comparative Perspective," Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education. Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 2008), 87, <http://0-www.informaworld.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/10.1080/0305792070142....

[56] Ibid., 90-91.

[57] Kamal Chenoy, "Contending Nationalisms," 26, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1191682541&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& ;RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[58] Gautam Navlakha, "State Cultivation of the Amarnath Yatra," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 30, July 26 - August 01, 2008, 17, <http://epw.in/uploads/articles/12471.pdf>

[59] Kamal Chenoy, "Contending Nationalisms," 26, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1191682541&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& ;RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[60] Ibid., 25.

[61] Gautam Navlakha, "Resentment Persists in Kashmir," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 06, February 09 - February 15, 2008, 15, <http://epw.in/uploads/articles/11744.pdf>.

[62] Howard B. Schaffer et al., "Kashmir: Fifty Years of Running in Place," 316.

[63] Shakti Bhatt, "State Terrorism vs. Jihad in Kashmir," 222, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=356112101&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[64] Ibid., 221.

[65] Gautam Navlakha, "Doctrine for Sub-conventional Operations: A Critique," 1245, <http://epw.in/uploads/articles/10465.pdf>.

[66] Alexander Evans, "Why Peace Won't Come to Kashmir," 173, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=70990603&Fmt=6&clientId=48347&R QT=309&VName=PQD>.

[67] Kamal Chenoy, "Contending Nationalisms," 27, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1191682541&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& ;RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[68] Shakti Bhatt, "State Terrorism vs. Jihad in Kashmir," 219-220, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=356112101&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[69] Alexander Evans, "Why Peace Won't Come to Kashmir," 174, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=70990603&Fmt=6&clientId=48347&R QT=309&VName=PQD>.

[70] Mohan Malik, "The China Factor in the India-Pakistan Conflict," Parameters, Carlisle Barracks: Spring 2003. Vol. 33, Iss. 1, 43-45, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=301391621&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[71] Alexander Evans, "Why Peace Won't Come to Kashmir," 172, 174, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=70990603&Fmt=6&clientId=48347&R QT=309&VName=PQD>.

[72] Gautam Navlakha, e-mail message to author, January 26, 2009.

[73] Kamal Chenoy, "Contending Nationalisms," 25, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1191682541&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& ;RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[74] Ibid., 26.

[75] Gautam Navlakha, "Jammu and Kashmir Elections: A Shift in Equations," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 44, No. 03, January 17 - January 23, 2009, 11, <http://epw.in/uploads/articles/13080.pdf>.

[76] Ibid., 10.

[77] Ibid., 12.

[78] Gautam Navlakha, "State of Jammu and Kashmir's Economy," 4035-4037, <http://epw.in/uploads/articles/11105.pdf>.

[79] John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

[80] Class Discussion, February 2, 2009.

[81] Sumantra Bose, "Kashmir," In Contested Lands, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 184-186.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Kamal Chenoy, "Contending Nationalisms," 27, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1191682541&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& ;RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[84] Howard B. Schaffer et al., "Kashmir: Fifty Years of Running in Place," 314-315.

[85] Sumantra Bose, "Kashmir," In Contested Lands, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 192-197.

[86] Ibid., 198.

[87] Ibid., 161.

[88] Howard B. Schaffer et al., "Kashmir: Fifty Years of Running in Place," 313-314.

[89] Alexander Evans, "Why Peace Won't Come to Kashmir," 171, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=70990603&Fmt=6&clientId=48347&R QT=309&VName=PQD>.

[90] Howard B. Schaffer et al., "Kashmir: Fifty Years of Running in Place," 315-316.

[91] Mohan Malik, "The China Factor in the India-Pakistan Conflict," Parameters, Carlisle Barracks: Spring 2003. Vol. 33, Iss. 1, 40, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=301391621&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[92] Kamal Chenoy, "Contending Nationalisms," 27, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1191682541&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& ;RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[93] Sumantra Bose, "Kashmir," In Contested Lands, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 198.

[94] Ibid., 184.

[95] John W. McDonald, "Multi-Track Diplomacy," Beyond Intractability, Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: September 2003. <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/multi-track-diplomacy/>.

[96] Class Discussion/PowerPoint, February 9, 2009.

[97] Sumantra Bose, "Kashmir," In Contested Lands, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 198.

[98] Ibid., 185, 196.

[99] John W. McDonald, "Multi-Track Diplomacy," Beyond Intractability.

[100] Shakti Bhatt, "State Terrorism vs. Jihad in Kashmir," 221-222, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=356112101&Fmt=3&clientId=48347& RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

[101] Robert O. Keohane et al., "Realism and Complex Interdependence," In Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy. New York : Oxford University Press, 1991.

[102] Gautam Navlakha, "State of Jammu and Kashmir's Economy," 4034, <http://epw.in/uploads/articles/11105.pdf>.

[103] Sumantra Bose, "Kashmir," In Contested Lands, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 197-198.

[104] Howard B. Schaffer et al., "Kashmir: Fifty Years of Running in Place," 313.

[105] Ibid., 314.

[106] Carrie Antal, "Reflections on Religious Nationalism, Conflict and Schooling in Developing Democracies: India and Israel in Comparative Perspective," 97-98, <http://0-www.informaworld.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/10.1080/0305792070142....

[107] John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies.

[108] Ibid.